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In  the  present  paper  we  study  the  distributive  impact  of  institutional  change  in 
developing  countries.  In  such  economies,  economic  institutions,  such  as  property 
rights systems, may act to preserve the interests of a rich minority, but this depends 
crucially on the level of political equality. For example, dominant classes can control 
key-markets, access to assets and investment opportunities, especially if they enjoy 
disproportionate political power. We test this hypothesis using cross-section and panel 
data methods on a sample of low- and middle-income economies from Africa, Asia 
and  Latin  America.  Results  suggest  that:  (a)  increasing  the  protection  of  property 
rights  increases  income  inequality;  (b)  such  an  effect  is  larger  in  low-democracy 
environments; (c) a minority of countries have developed a set political institutions 
capable of counterbalancing this effect. 
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1. Introduction 
The distribution of resources and the rules that govern the economy are central to  
economic  development.  Western  economies  have  long  undergone  economic  and  political 
transformations that have delivered a high level of income per capita and nearly uniform 
levels of socially-acceptable income inequality. In developing economies, instead, economic 
performance reflect institutional arrangements – created in colonial times and inherited by 
postcolonial states – that were ill-suited for development. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2005) summarise this research: they trace the primary cause of economic backwardness to 
the  way  economic  and  political  institutions  in  developing  economies  function.  Similarly, 
Besley and Ghatak (2009) emphasise the importance of property rights. However, while the 
effects  of  institutions  on  national  income  have  been  extensively  researched,  their 
distributional impact has not received adequate consideration so far.  
An  assessment  of  this  impact  is  particularly  relevant  for  developing  economies.  
Indeed,  a steady concentration of income is often one of the main characteristics of these 
economies. Moreover, they have recently started further institutional reforms, which is an 
ongoing process. From the political point of view, an increasing number of countries have 
tried to move away from authoritarian politics and unaccountable governments and started 
experimenting with forms of procedural democracy. Especially in the post Cold War era when 
electoral competition was introduced. On the economic front, production and exchange have  
mimicked those of richer economies, such as increased privatisation and deregulation. These 
reforms and the way they relate to historical institutional structures must have an impact on 
efficiency.  But  what  are  the  effects  on  equity?  We  do  not  know  a  great  deal  about  the 
distributional consequences of institutional change. 
Principles of economics of inequality suggest  that the possibility of acquiring factors 
of production, the right to any benefit from them and initial endowment (as well as ability to 
increase  one’s  marginal  productivity)  determine  each  person’s  amount  of  income  (see 
Champernowne and Cowell, 1998). Institutional and political processes affect this amount  
because they mould the individual’s incentives and constraints the range of activities they can 
undertake. Such processes set the rules that shape property relations and, consequently, the 
rewards each production factor receives.  Institutions affect taxation, wage-setting policies, 
strategies  that  promote  or  hinder  the  acquisition  of  skills  among  different  sectors  of  the 
population and access into markets. Ultimately, all these elements relate to agents’ capability 
to earn and appropriate income from the production factors they own, i.e. property rights   3 
regimes. We refer to this set of economic institutions as the rules, both formal and  informal, 
defining and protecting private property which enhance the ability to appropriate returns from 
ownership and use of factors of production.  
In  this  paper  we  use  both  cross-section  and  panel  data  methods  to  investigate 
empirically the effect of property rights on income inequality in developing countries. Such 
institutions  can  exacerbate  inequality  if  they  are  conceived  to  preserve  or  increase  the 
economic and political interests of privileged minorities. For instance, one’s property rights 
can  also  be  protected  by  weakening  the  risk  of  expropriation  of  productive  assets  via 
controlling the political system, by erecting barriers to entry, or by setting favourable tax 
regimes, as well as engaging in rent-seeking activities (see Acemoglu, 2008). In all these 
cases, the resulting property rights may be inequitable. Unlike previous literature, we account 
for the interaction between political and economic institutions. In particular, we highlight that 
a situation where property relations are inequitable is more likely to occur in environments 
where political power is disproportionately allocated to oligarchies. In developing economies, 
an undemocratic power structure could prevent such economies from building an institutional 
apparatus  that  can  alleviate  the  concentration  of  income.  These  phenomena  could  be 
prominent  in  many  ex-colonies,  where  economic  institutions  could  have  led  to  high  and 
persistent inequality.  
An assessment of the impact of economic institutions on income inequality is useful to 
understand reforms  aimed at creating investment incentives or at  extending the  economic 
opportunities  of  low-income  groups  (for  example,  access  to  and  control  of  factors  of 
production and assets or workers’ right to organise and bargain). The paper also provides 
novel evidence on the relationship between political systems and economic inequality. The 
standard  argument  would  suggests  that  democratic  politics  may  increase  redistributive 
expenditure. Democratisation, instead, could affect the level of income inequality ‘indirectly’ 
by changing the functioning of property rights systems.  
This is consistent with recent literature on the determinants of inequality. Bourguignon 
et al. (2007, pp.250-253) call for a systematic analysis of the effect of institutions, in the 
current and future research agenda on the persistence of inequality. Bowles (2004) has coined 
the expression “institutional poverty traps” to refer to institutional arrangements that engender 
inequality.
2    This  paper  also  deals  with  the  debate  relating  to  the  evolution  of  inequality 
during the process of development. A perennial question in the study of income inequality is: 
                                                 
2 The role of institutions is emphasised also by Atkinson (1997), stressing the role of social customs and norms.    4 
are  there  are  any  factors  that  lead  inequality  to  describe  an  inverted-U  pattern  as  output 
increases  (see,  for  example,  Milanovic,  2000)?  Recent  literature  suggests  that  the  actual 
trajectory of inequality could depend on institutional arrangements adopted by governments, 
which  distribute  the  gains  of  economic  growth  across  the  population  (Acemoglu  and 
Robinson, 2002; Piketty, 2006).
3 Finally, the paper contributes to the broader literature which 
investigates the determinants of income distribution within and across countries, as suggested 
by  Atkinson  (1997).  For  example,  cross-national  studies  have  emphasised  the  role  of 
democratisation,  financial  development  and  education  (Li,  Squire  and  Zou,  1998)  and, 
recently, the role of colonialism (Angeles, 2007) and factor rewards, especially labour’s share 
(Daudey and García-Peñalosa, 2007).  
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  section  2  we  discuss  the  hypotheses  to  be 
investigated empirically. Section 3 formulates the empirical model to be tested and we also 
introduce the data used. The results are presented in section 4. The final section summarises 
and discuss the implications of the empirical results.     
2. Inequality and institutions: theoretical and empirical issues 
2.1 Theoretical issues  
Does improved property rights protection increase or decrease inequality? In principle, 
the effect could take either sign. We should know in whose favour such rules work or whose 
property rights are protected. Some literature outlines the following causal mechanism. The 
presence and exploitation of factor endowments in many colonial economies, such as labour 
abundance, natural resources and soil suitability for cash crops with substantial economies of 
scale, explain extreme level of historical inequality in income, human capital and political 
power.  Such  historical  conditions  allowed  colonial  elites  to  establish  an  institutional 
framework that secured the investment returns for the few, so reinforcing income inequality 
over  time.  This  state  of  affairs  did  not  change  after  the  end  of  colonialism.  Hence,  the 
functioning  of  laws  pertaining  to  property  rights  and  economic  relationships,  since 
independence,  contribute  to  the  persistence  of  inequality.  Angeles  (2007)  shows  that  the 
presence of a European minority is associated with production systems aimed at exploiting 
native populations (and is a robust predictor of current income inequality in pooled OLS 
                                                 
3  Acemoglu  and  Robinson  (2002)  formalised  the  idea  that  inequality  could  be  the  result  of  institutional 
transformation  which encourage redistribution and is  forced by the threat of social unrest.  Sustained social 
mobilisation channelled Western economies on an inverted-U pattern, while some economies in sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America have experienced an ‘autocratic disaster’.
    5 
regressions).  For  example,  in  South  Africa,  the  British  and  Afrikaners  dominated  the 
agricultural and mining resources prohibiting the acquisition of land by natives (and political 
power passed to European descendants following independence). Jolly (2006) observes that in 
developing economies inequalities of landholdings, mine or forest resources are high because 
at the time of independence constitutions often prevent property disputes (or only allow this if 
there  is  to  be  a  full  compensation).  In  other  cases,  property  rights  (for  example,  mining 
royalties) have been allocated either through political connections or even by subverting the 
political system (such as, mounting a coup). Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) went further to 
document how certain forms of inequitable institutions arose in many Latin American and 
sub-Saharan African economies. In order to exploit their natural resources, labour abundance 
and  soil  fertility,  colonisers  established  exploitative  institutions  in  many  areas  of  Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Property relations created and perpetuated the concentration of 
income and wealth  in economies that were rich in minerals or had suitable soil for large-
plantation commodities for the production of cash crops (e.g. sugar, coffee, and bananas) 
using forced labour. Examples of these are found in Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala and the 
Caribbean islands, but also Mexico, Peru and Bolivia.
4 Morrisson (2006) has showed that the 
existence  of  dualistic  structures  in  colonial  and  postcolonial  Senegal  and  Kenya  has  kept 
inequality high, while Ghana had taxation and labour market structures such that inequality 
was low. In some other areas of sub-Saharan Africa, the functioning of agricultural markets 
and the extraction of natural resources was distorted in the favour specific groups, primarily 
the political and economic elites and their clients in the urban areas. Small-scale farmers were 
‘expropriated’ of their crops which were sold at prices below the market level through state 
marketing  boards,  to  whom  they  were  compelled  to  sell  (Bates,  1988).  The  presence  of 
natural  wealth,  whether  controlled  by  a  state-owned  or  private  enterprise,  co-exists  with 
systems that extract rents (Milanovic, 2003).
5  
Following  this  literature,  the  access  to  and  the  reward  of  production  factors  were 
                                                 
4 This also created societies where political power ensured the elite had a disproportionate influence on the 
economy. The share of the voting population in the region has historically been very low, franchise was granted 
under wealth and literacy requirements, and lack of secrecy of vote was also a recurring feature of political 
systems (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005). 
5 Such phenomena may not be so pervasive in south and east Asia (quite exceptional is the case of Taiwan and 
South Korea, where land education inequality decreased substantially). Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) define 
‘East Asian miracle’ phenomena of ‘growth with equity’ in Asia (as opposed to the ‘growth with inequality’ in 
Latin America and the recent increase in economic inequality in Western Countries, e.g. Britain and USA). 
Bardhan (2005) observes that cultural values in India and China translated in formal and informal rules that 
made such societies relatively more egalitarian (e.g., the absence of law of primogeniture has contributed to keep 
low land inequality). Perhaps not negligible is also East Asia’s reduced importance of cash crops and mineral 
resources, exceptions being plantation economies such as Sri Lanka and The Philippines.   6 
created to protect the interests of an influential minority. Hence, we are going to test the 
hypothesis that property rights regimes contributed to increase inequality. Before turning to 
this, we have to discuss the role of political systems and their interplay with economic rules.  
Extending the franchise is expected to deliver a reduction in inequality. If the median 
voter shifts the income distribution below the mean income one should expect higher taxation, 
and more redistributive policies. The amount will be proportional to the level of inequality 
prior to democratisation, that is the initial number of poor. Yet, such mechanisms are not 
consistent with the experiences of developing economies. In fact, econometric evidence does 
not find a robust correlation between the two variables (see, for a recent review, Gradstein and 
Milanovic, 2004). Are there any other types of redistributive effects? The redistributive role 
of democratisation could be ‘indirect’, rather than directly through public expenditure. Here, 
we consider and test the idea that a democratic political system could be a necessary condition 
to change property relations either weakening the property rights of the elite or strengthening 
the  property  rights  of  the  poor.  Examples  of  this  could  cover  wage-setting  policies  to 
regulating entry into markets. Rodrik (1999) and Robinson (2001) have argued, and provided 
evidence,  that  democracies  redistribute  by  increasing  the  wages  share  through  reforms  of 
labour market institutions; e.g. workers have the right to organise in order to increase their 
bargaining power, there are higher minimum wages and more favourable hiring and firing 
practices. Acemoglu (2008) has suggested that the form that property rights in democratic 
environments works differently than in oligarchic ones. In the latter the dominant economic 
elite  has  enough  political  power  to  control  key-markets  by  erecting  entry  barriers  (e.g. 
through direct regulation, but also obtaining subsidised credit or inputs) as well as protecting 
themselves from expropriation and from redistributive taxation and thus protecting their own 
property  rights. Unlike  democratic societies, oligarchic societies provide limited access to 
property  rights  and  worse  distributional  outcomes.  Developing  economies  might  have,  in 
most cases, established property rights that reflect the unequal balance of political power. If 
this  is  the  case,  economic  inequality  is  also  explained  by  the  interplay  of  political  and 
economic institutions. Economic institutions grant narrow or broad access to property rights 
according to the degree of inclusiveness of the political system. Hence, the distributional 
effects of property rights can be different at different stages of democratisation. 
2.3 Empirical literature  
Cross-national  investigations  on  the  determinants  of  economic  inequality  in 
developing countries are sparse (an exception is Milanovic, 2003) and the role of economic   7 
institutions has not been systematically addressed. Perhaps this is, in part, due to the limited  
availability  of  inequality  data  in  developing  economies.  There  are,  however,  few  recent 
studies  that  consider  the  distributive  impact  of  institutions  in  the  broader  geographical 
context. The first test was provided in Chong and Calderon (2000), taking a cross-sectional 
approach. With a sample covering 70 developed as well as developing countries, results show 
that  institutional  quality  measured  by  a  composite  index  based  on  political  risk  data  by 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Business Environmental Risk Intelligence 
(BERI)
6,  displays  a  quadratic  relationship  with  income  inequality.  For  poor  economies 
institutional quality is positively linked with income inequality, but the inverse holds for rich 
economies. Another cross-section study, on the other hand, finds a statistically insignificant 
impact for institutions with OLS regressions using a linear specification (Sylwester, 2004).
7 
Chong and Gradstein (2007) study, using a panel of more than 100 countries and controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity, the correlation between income inequality and a number of 
institutional  indicators,  capturing  democratic  and  institutional  stability  aspects,  and  find 
evidence  for  ‘better’  institutions  reducing  income  inequality.
8  Similarly,  Carmignani 
(forthcoming), estimating a system aimed at explaining the amount of redistribution (in a 
panel of countries), finds that weaker institutions (measured also with a property rights index) 
also have  a distributional impact, raising income inequality.  
Empirical research is limited and has tended to treat institutions as an indistinct body, 
while it could be insightful to disentangle the impact of political and economic institutions. 
Political systems have a distinct role from economic institutions. Democracy  can directly 
affect economic inequality but it also moulds economic institutions by including or excluding 
the citizens from the political process which builds economic systems. Hence, property rights 
issues could be linked to the nature of the political regime. While in developed economies 
institutions are stable and consolidated, in less developed economies institutional failures are 
by far more frequent and extensive. After all, the issue of institutional reform, especially 
property rights clarity, is high on the agenda of development scholars and policy makers alike. 
Here, at least in part, we intend to fill these gaps. 
                                                 
6 From ICRG: (i) ‘risk of expropriation’; (ii) ‘repudiation of contracts by government’; (iii) ‘law and order 
tradition’;  (iv)  ‘corruption  in  government’;  and  (v)  ‘quality  of  bureaucracy’.  From  BERI:  (i)  ‘contract 
enforceability’; (ii) ‘nationalization potential’; (iii) ‘bureaucratic delays’; and (iv) ‘infrastructure quality’. 
7 On a sample of ex-colonies (including USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), and using a composite index 
of  institutional  development  (consisting  of  political  rights  and  civil  liberties,  political  stability,  government 
effectiveness, limits to government regulation and adherence to the rule of law).  
8 They use Freedom House political rights and civil liberties indices; and ‘rule of law’, ‘corruption’, ‘government 
stability’, ‘bureaucratic quality’ and ‘democratic accountability’ from ICRG.   8 
3. Methodology and data   
Regressions based on cross-section averages can be a suitable tool to test relationships 
whose mechanisms are long run characteristics, as argued in Easterly (2007).
9 In this case, 
how political and institutional development contributed to present-day inequalities (e.g. post-
colonial, or even colonial, history).
 Hence, an empirical counterpart to the foregoing ideas can 
take the following functional form: 
'
, , 1 0 1 , , 1 2 , , 1 , , 1 1     (1) i T T i t t i t t i t t i t t Ineq I Q X b b b f e - - - - , , - = + × + × + ×  +   
Where, , , 1 i T T Ineq -  is the average inequality index of interest for country i between the end of 
the sample period, T, and T-1.  , , 1 i t t Q -  is a measure of economic institutions, i.e. clarity of 
property  rights,  for  country  i  between  times  t  and  t-1,  with  t<T-1.  The  choice  of  period 
attenuates problems of reverse causality that might cloud the inference about property rights.  
Similarly, the level of political democracy is  , 1 i t t I , - . In practice, a suitable response variable 
can be Gini coefficient measured as the average of the available observations from 1991 to the 
end  of  the  sample  period,  while  we  use  averages  of  democracy  and  of  the  available 
observations  of  the  property  rights  rating.  The  coefficient  β1  and  β2  can  be  interpreted, 
respectively, as the long run effect of democratic and property rights consolidation on income 
inequality.  
, , 1 i t t X - is  a  set  (kx1  vector)  of  controls.  Following  Li,  Squire  and  Zou  (1998),  we 
control  for  education,  land  inequality  and  the  level  of  financial  development  (a  set  of 
inequality determinants whose effects, as we shall test, could also be depending on the level 
of  democratisation).  The  average  level  of  education  provides  a  greater  supply  of  skilled 
labour,  which  tends  to  reduce  the  skill  premium  and  hence  reduces  inequality  in  the 
distribution of labour incomes. Land inequality and the level of financial development are 
capturing assets inequality: how difficult it is to access credit for the poor, lacking collaterals. 
We also control for regional dummies, to capture unobserved regional effects; other long-run 
determinants of inequality, which include the level economic development – measured by 
GDP per capita, to capture economy-size effects – and its square, to capture Kuznets curve-
type effects; and inflation, which hits the poor harder, as they are normally unable to hedge 
against it. Equation (1) also conditions on the suitability of land for wheat versus sugarcane, 
which, as elaborated by Easterly (2007), is exogenous and picks the historical variation of 
inequality.  Finally, , , 1 i t t e -  is the error, capturing all other omitted factors. 
                                                 
9 Contributions following this strategy are Chong and Calderon (2000) and Daudey and García-Peñalosa (2007).    9 




, , 1 0 1 , , 1 2 , , 1 3 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 1     (2) i T T i t t i t t i t t i t t i t t i t t Ineq I Q Q I X b b b b f e - - - - - - , , - = + × + × + × × + ×  +   
Equation (2) admits that the estimated parameters can be heterogeneous across the population, 
and interaction terms are one way to account for that.
 Hence, the partial effect of property 
rights institutions is now conditional on democratic consolidation: 2 3 , , 1 i t t Ineq Q I b b - ¶ ¶ = + × . 
In particular, β2 is the impact of one unit change in property rights institutions on income 
inequality  when  democracy  is  zero.  We  expect  that  stronger  property  rights  protection 
increases  income  inequality,  β2  is  positive.  Such  effect  is  moderated  by  increased 
democratisation as this process modifies the functioning of property rights; therefore, β3 is 
expected to take a negative sign. However, from estimating (2) alone we cannot observe if 
economic institutions have a significant effect on inequality when democracy is not zero, 
although all these cases can be very informative. Thus, for a full interpretation of the partial 
effects, we have to plug in the values of democracy and then recalculate standard errors and 
significance of the resulting marginal effect.   
Relying on the cross-section approach – as in (1) and (2) – would enable us to tell 
which  countries  adopt  inequitable  economic  institutions  based  on  choices  on  the  political 
structure rooted in (recent) history. And it is consistent with the literature, which tries to 
explain long run phenomena. The potential consequence of averaging the variables over years 
is that it tends to obscure episodes of political and institutional change within countries which 
should be reflected in a subsequent change in the distribution of resources. For example, such 
approach  does  not  capture  the  likely  effects  of  episodes  of  political  reforms  towards 
democratisation over time or, vice versa, of reversions to authoritarianism (e.g. some Latin 
American nations). If this is the case, one could complement the evidence from cross-section 
regressions based on averages with a panel approach, as it can validate such results if we 
concentrate  on  the  within  variation.  A  causal  link  between  property  rights  and  inequality 
suggests  that  we  should  also  see  a  relationship  between  changes  in  property  rights  and 
changes  in  income  inequality.  Put  it  differently,  we  should  be  able  to  ask:  does  income 
concentration  (with  its  other  characteristics  held  constant)  become  higher  when  its  legal 
system increase private property protection? To answer such question one has to investigate 
whether the cross-sectional relationship between the variables of interest disappears when 
country fixed effects are included in the regression, thus removing the long-run determinants 
of both property rights protection and inequality that are time-invariant. Furthermore, we can 
minimise the confounding effect of omitted variables by controlling for common trends, e.g.   10 
the decades since the late 1970s have witnessed world-wide economic and political shocks.  
In  practice,  such  approach  could  not  be  as  effective  as  expected.  The  causal 
mechanisms, and the variables under scrutiny, have long run features and evolve slowly over 
time. The available data structure, as we shall discuss below, is not the best-suited for this 
type of analysis. The time dimension of the available panel of developing economies is such 
that, while property rights and democracy show enough variability over time, inequality tends 
to change a lot across countries, but little over time. Hence, procedures that remove the effects 
of  time  invariant  factors  also  remove  most  of  the  variation  the  one  wants  to  explain.  
Notwithstanding, we attempt to investigate the short run behaviour of the relationships under 
scrutiny by exploiting within country variation, even though, as we shall argue, results should 
be  treated  with  caution.  This  requires  estimating  the  relationships  of  interest  using  Fixed 
Effects (FE) estimator, which is entirely based on time-series variation (e.g. as captured by 
deviations from individual means, Within estimator).  
3.1 Data 
This study uses aggregate data at country level. The sample is composed of sixty-three 
developing  countries  (which  are  not  transition  economies),  defined  as  low-  and  middle-
income economies  in South and Central America, sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the 
Middle East and Asia. The data appendix provides a list, divided by regions.  
Our preferred measure of protection of private property rights is extracted from the 
Index  of  Economic  Freedom  of  the  Fraser  Institute.  In  its  recent  denomination,  Legal 
Structure and Security of Property Rights is a continuous variable ranging between 1 and 10; 
a higher score corresponds to a better protection of private property rights. As far as we are 
aware, it is available over a longest time span –  having been recorded, every five years, from 
1970 until 2000 (and every  year from 2001 on) – also for a large number of developing 
economies. This makes  it crucial to conduct panel data  analysis.  It is  a  subjective index: 
expresses experts’ views – from the business community and academia – on how secure they 
consider investments to be in a given country, according to a number of dimensions (they do 
not tell us about the ‘breadth’ of private property rights – i.e. the allocation of such rights).
 10 
                                                 
10 It has been assembled over the years from different sources – essentially, but not exclusively, the International 
Country Risk Guide, the Business Environment Risk Intelligence, and the Global Competitiveness Report – and 
has  undergone  some changes in the definition, although the  underlying concept stayed unchanged (see, for 
details, the various Economic Freedom of the World Reports, e.g. Gwartney and Lawson,  2007). It includes: (a) 
Judicial  independence  (from  GCR):  the  judiciary  is  independent  and  not  subject  to  interference  by  the 
government or parties in dispute (This component is from the Global Competitiveness Report’s question: “Is the 
judiciary in your country independent from political influences of members of government, citizens, or firms?   11 
  As a democratisation measure, we utilise the database by Vanhanen (2000), which is a 
continuous variable – taking values greater or equal to zero – based on objective assessment. 
It is computed (by multiplying and dividing by 100) from equally weighting two indices: 
competition and participation.
11 It is a ‘parsimonious’ index, which captures few necessary 
attributes of procedural democracy. This feature is appealing, as makes the index free from 
judgment on the attributes that political democracy should have (e.g. some analysts consider a 
market-based economic system and protection of private property as defining attributes).  
To measure income inequality, our preferred index is the Gini coefficient. Although 
UNU-WIDER (2007) offered a higher quality dataset, the World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID),  one  must  address  the  well-known  comparability  problems  that  exist  when  using 
secondary datasets of income inequality. Hence, we had to select and adjust the available 
observations to make the observations as consistent as possible to obtain the Gini coefficient 
of disposable household income.
12 
                                                                                                                                                         
No—heavily  influenced  (=1)  or  Yes—entirely  independent  (=7).”  See  World  Economic  Forum,  Global 
Competitiveness Report (various issues), at http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/index.htm). (b) Impartial 
courts  (from  GCR):  a  trusted  legal  framework  exists  for  private  businesses  to  challenge  the  legality  of 
government actions or regulation (this component is from the Global Competitiveness Report’s question: “The 
legal  framework  in  your  country  for  private  businesses  to  settle  disputes  and  challenge  the  legality  of 
government actions and/or regulations is inefficient and subject to manipulation (=1) or is efficient and follows a 
clear, neutral process (=7).” (c) Protection of property rights (from GCR): this component is from the Global 
Competitiveness Report’s question: “Property rights, including over financial assets are poorly defined and not 
protected by law (=1) or are clearly defined and well protected by law (=7).” (d) Military interference in the rule 
of law  and  the political process (from ICRG); This component is based on the  International Country Risk 
Guide’s Political Risk Component Military in Politics: “A measure of the military’s involvement in politics. 
Since the military is not elected, involvement, even at a peripheral level, diminishes democratic accountability. 
Military involvement in government might stem because of an actual or created internal or external threat. Such 
a  situation  would  imply  the  distortion  of  government  policy  in  order  to  meet  this  threat,  for  example  by 
increasing the defence budget at the expense of other budget allocations. In some countries, the threat of military 
take-over can force an elected government to change policy or cause its replacement by another government 
more amenable to the military’s wishes. A military takeover or threat of a takeover may also represent a high 
risk if it is an indication that the government is unable to function effectively and that the country therefore has 
an uneasy environment for foreign businesses. A full-scale military regime poses the greatest risk. In the short 
term a military regime may provide a new stability and thus reduce business risks. However, in the longer term 
the risk will almost certainly rise, partly because the system of governance will be become corrupt and partly 
because the continuation of such a government is likely to create an armed opposition.” (e) Rule of law (from 
ICRG, see above): it is defined as integrity of the legal system, i.e. strength and impartiality of the legal system 
and popular observance of the law.  
11 Competition is calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the largest party from 100 (i.e. the 
smaller parties’ share of the votes cast in parliamentary or presidential elections). If data on the distribution of 
votes  are  not  available,  this  variable  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  distribution  of  seats  in  parliament. 
Participation is calculated as the share of population that actually votes as a percentage of total population. 
12 From the version 2b of the WIID, we first delete all observations for which the underlying notion of income or 
earnings  is  unknown  or  incomplete  (‘quality  4’  data,  the  lowest  ranking),  and  thus  we  only  use  the  top  3 
rankings.  To  maximise  the  comparability  over  time  (within  each  country),  we  have  adopted  the  following 
procedure. Following a suggestion by Luis Angeles (to whom we are grateful), we formed a series for each 
country by keeping the observations coming from the same source and survey, which represented the majority of 
the observations for the country. In this way, we should be confident that Gini coefficients, quintiles and deciles 
coming from WIID are as comparable as possible – at least along the time evolution, which is crucial in panel 
models – because known and unknown methodological differences are potentially accounted for. Of course, this   12 
Large and updated land inequality data have remained scarce. Nevertheless, Easterly 
(2007) has recently suggested the use of the share of agricultural land occupied by family 
farms – recorded every ten years from 1858 to 1998 – assembled from many different sources 
by Vanhanen (2005), which is a proxy of land and asset inequality. In panel regressions, its 
data points are too few to yield a meaningful sample size. However, we can exploit another 
proxy for asset inequality. Despite some data quality issues, Castelló and Doménech (2002) 
constructed  measures  of  human  capital  inequality  for  a  panel  of  108  countries.  Taking 
attainment levels (average schooling years of the population aged 15 years and over)  from 
Barro and Lee (2001), they compute Gini coefficients and the distribution of education by 
quintiles over five-year intervals from 1960 to 2000.  
Our dataset is completed with the secondary enrolment rate by Barro and Lee (2001), 
and some macroeconomic variables from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2007): annual inflation (consumer price index), GDP per capita, and the ratio of a measure of 
money  supply  (monetary  aggregate  M2)  on  GDP,  capturing  the  level  of  financial 
development.  
4. Empirical analysis and results 
4.1 Cross-section evidence  
Figure 1 plots the Gini-WIID average of the available observations from 1991 to 2000 and of 
the democratisation index averaged over 1960-1990 – where the vertical and horizontal lines 
are the averages of Gini index (at 45.52) and democratisation (at 5.44). The regression line  
has  a  coefficient  of  0.017,  and  a  t-ratio  =  0.11  (R-squared  =  0.0002,  58  countries).  The 
regression line essentially overlaps with the mean. Hence, there seems to be weak correlation 
                                                                                                                                                         
holds if one assumes that there have been no changes in the methodology of the survey used to construct the 
series for each country – or if they occurred, they had little effect. However, this also means throwing away a 
great deal of information. For the majority of developing economies, we would end up with few data points. 
Then, each selected series have been supplemented with observations originated in other surveys (than the one 
with the majority of observations) only if at least income definition and the income sharing unit are equivalent, 
as well as the area and population coverage is most extensive. As indicated in the revision notes of the most 
recent  version  of  the  database  manual  (UNU/WIDER,  2007),  for  Latin  American  countries  we  kept  the 
observations computed by SEDLAC, as they already display a good degree of harmonization. The procedure, as 
it is, ensures that inequality measures are as comparable as possible within each country, but leaves us with the 
problem that they are not comparable among different countries. This could result in a substantial error if one 
wants to compare developing countries among themselves.  Hence, the next step is to amend the above series in 
a way that they become comparable across countries. Following the ‘old fashioned’ approach, major sources of 
incomparability  across  countries  have  been  identified  by  introducing  the  dummies  for  gross  income  and 
earnings, expenditure and consumption, and person as a reference unit.  Regressing the dummies against the 
observed data produces the correction factors to estimate the normalisation to Gini coefficient of disposable 
household income.   13 
between the development of democratic systems and income inequality.  
Figure 1 [about here] 
Figure 2 [about here] 
How do property rights correlate with income inequality instead? In figure 2, the scatter plot 
of the Gini index against the property rights index (respective averages are 45.52 and 4.11) – 
taken as an average of the available observations from the 1980s to 1990 – shows a moderate, 
positive  correlation,  with  an  estimated  coefficient  of  1.621,  t-ratio=2.02  (R
2=0.061,  47 
countries).  However, when splitting the sample according to the mean (5.44) of the 1960-
1990 average of Vanhanen’s democracy index, we find that the slope can be quite pronounced 
in countries below democracy  average  (dots),  while in countries scores above such value 
(squares), the slope of the regression line switches to negative. Figure 3 suggests that the 
relationship  between  income  inequality  and  protection  of  private  property  in  developing 
economies could be a nonlinear one. Cross-section results will document if this is the case.  
Figure 3 [about here] 
Table 1 reports the regression results. The dependent variable is income inequality 
measured as the average of the available observations over 1991-2000. We first run an OLS 
regression where the 1980-90 average of property rights and the 1960-90 average democracy 
enter in linear form, together with the initial values of other determinants of income inequality 
(taken in years available for most developing economies): land inequality, level of education, 
financial development and GDP per capita (in log form). The property rights coefficient is 
insignificant at the conventional levels. But the effect of political and economic institutions on 
inequality  could  be  more  nuanced.  When  adding  the  Political  rights-Property  rights 
interaction  term,  the  result  changes.  Both  the  property  rights  coefficient,  β2,  and  the 
interaction term coefficient, β3, are highly significant. The goodness of fit improves. A linear 
restrictions test of the joint significance of β2 and β3 rejects the null of both being zero at 1% 
confidence level (also in all the remaining regressions). The third and fourth columns  verify 
that this is not the result of omitted variables, where the coefficients of interest are picking the 
effect of historical or region-specific factors. Introducing regional dummies and the (natural 
log of) wheat/sugar ratio, as proposed by Easterly (2007), to capture the historical conditions 
for inequality as the suitability of land to sugar versus wheat cultivation, does not alter the 
results.
13  The  fifth  column  re-estimates  the  model  using  robust  regression  methods, 
confirming that outliers are not actually driving the key results, while the last two regressions 
                                                 
13 Based on FAO data, it is defined as log(wheat/sugar)=log[(1+share of arable land suitable for wheat)/(1+share   14 
introduce alternative democracy and property rights measures and re-estimate the model using 
OLS and robust regression.
14 Utilising the Political Rights index by Freedom House and the 
property rights index based on data from the International Country Risk Guide (produced by 
Political Risk Services and available only from 1984 to 1997) does not affect our key results 
(magnitudes are different due to different scales). 
Table 1 [about here] 
Perhaps  the  most  interesting  implications  arise  from  the  joint  interpretation  of 
magnitude and sign of  β2 and β3. Following the fourth model, β2 shows that a one point 
increase in the property rights score triggers an increase income inequality Gini index of 
2.166  points,  when  democracy  scores  zero.  The  ongoing  system  of  property  rights  will 
increase  inequality,  in  autocratic  regimes.  Although  empirically  relevant  (as  six  countries 
score zero democratisation), this must be supplemented with an assessment when democracy 
takes values greater than zero. In figure 4, we report the partial effects at the observed values 
of the 1960-1990 democratisation index in the sample (continuous line, where each dot is the 
country’s partial effect) and their statistical significance (95% confidence intervals, with a 
dashed line). For the majority of the countries there is a positive and significant effect of 
property rights of inequality (significant at least at 5% confidence level) and its value ranges, 
approximately, from 1.2 to 2.2 Gini points for a one-unit increase in property rights, which 
seems sizable (the Fraser property rights index has a standard deviation of 1.26).
15 Figure 4 
also shows that countries with more democratic political institutions are able to mitigate first, 
and then to reverse the sign of the marginal effect from positive to negative, so reducing 
inequality. A second  group of countries falls in the region bounded between the two 5% 
confidence lines of the graph, where the calculated marginal effect is statistically not different 
from zero.
16 Finally, only a handful countries seem to have created political systems such that 
the partial effect of economic institutions is reversed and shows a negative sign. In this small 
group of countries we find India, which is an established democracy. Uruguay, Venezuela and 
                                                                                                                                                         
of arable land suitable for sugarcane)].  
14  We  perform  Iteratively  Reweighted  Least  Squares  (IRLS),  which  works  iteratively  by  first  calculating  a 
measure of influential observations (Cook’s distance) and excluding any observation for which such measure is 
greater than 1. Then it performs a regression, calculates case weights based on absolute residuals, and regresses 
again using those weights. Iteration stops when the maximum change in weights drops below a given tolerance 
level. We use the default 0.001.  
15 Many countries falling in this group are Sub-Saharan African economies – e.g. Zimbabwe, Congo (Rep.), 
Tanzania, South Africa, Kenya, Zambia – also a few are Latin American countries belong to this group, e.g. 
Haiti,  Panama,  Chile,  Paraguay  and  Nicaragua.  Asian  countries  in  this  group  are  Indonesia,  Pakistan  and 
Bangladesh. 
16 In particular, countries scoring a democracy level approximately equal to 4 (out of 21.82, the maximum) are 
sufficiently democratic to neutralise the inequality-worsening effect of property rights.   15 
Costa  Rica  also  lie in  this  area.  However,  the  significance  of  the  partial  effects  for  such 
economies (with more consolidated democracy) is marginal (10% level), at best. 
Figure 4 [about here] 
4.1.1 Robustness checks  
We have experimented with a number of other controls: the square of  per capita GDP 
(to capture the likely existence of a Kuznets curve), inflation, and share of major religions. 
We have also checked robustness to an alternative democratisation index, using Polity2index 
(from Polity IV project). Sign and significance of the coefficients of interest do not change. 
It is also important to investigate if our inference about the population of developing 
countries might be affected by outlying observations or a few leverage data points so casting 
doubt on the generality of the results. Therefore, we performed formal checks for influential 
observations  based  on  popular  techniques  that  can  identify  countries  with  either  a  high 
leverage  or  large  residuals.  We  have  calculated  leverage  measures  based  on  hat  values, 
Cook’s Distance – considering points with high influence the ones higher than F0.5; k, (n-k) – and 
the DFITS statistic, taking as a threshold  2 / j D FITS k N > .  We used them jointly to detect 
countries that result as influential in more than one measure. Regressions excluding up to five 
countries with highest values in leverage measures do not significantly change our results.  
Next, we have checked to what extent influential observations affect the magnitude of 
specific  coefficients,  property  rights  and  its  interaction  with  democracy,  by  calculating 
DFBETA statistic. In this case too, results do not show any sensible change by excluding 
from the regression the values that are above the cut-off  2 j DFBETA N > . In particular, 
countries that seems to be potentially influential are The Philippines, Ghana and Jamaica for 
the property rights coefficient; and Venezuela for the interaction term coefficient. However, 
once removed from the regressions, our estimates show little sensitivity. 
Table 2 [about here] 
Our last robustness test is to exclude each continent from the regression, in turn, to 
check if any of them drives the results. Table 2 reports the results when using, for example, 
Political Rights and ICRG property rights scores. The signs of the coefficients of interest do 
not change, although one could have expected the results to be sensitive o the presence of 
Latin American economies. Magnitudes (and significance) are sensitive to including Sub-
Saharan  Africa  in  the  sample.  However,  we  estimate  the  same  model  with  much  less 
information of data, which does result in a loss of precision.   16 
4.2 Panel data evidence   
Results  based  on  cross-section  averages  suggest  that  strengthening  property  rights 
increases income inequality, and this is particularly large in low-democracy environments. So 
they also signal that political democracy could ‘indirectly’ affect the concentration of income 
in  a  market  economy,  by  affecting  the  functioning  of  the  rules  that  protect  and  enforce 
property rights, although only few developing economies have levels of democratisation high 
enough to counterbalance such effect. The complement to this analysis is to investigate the 
existence  of  a  relationship  between  changes  in  property  rights  and  changes  in  income 
inequality, bearing in mind the methodological caveats on the effectiveness of panel data. 
The panel has an unbalanced and unequally spaced structure, spanning from 1970 to 
2004. We average our series over 5-year periods (1970-1974, 1975-1979 and so on). But 
property rights scores (by Fraser institute), the proxy for asset (human capital) inequality, and 
education data are originally recorded at the very beginning of every 5-year episode (1970, 
1975 and so on). The descriptive statistics (reported in the appendix) show that the time 
dimension  of  the  key  variables  is  short  (average  T  is  less  that  3  for  both  inequality  and 
property rights). A significant part of the variation in property rights and democracy occurs 
within  countries  (they  exhibit  similar  standard  deviations  across  and  within  countries). 
Income inequality, instead, exhibits much variation across countries and little over time (in 
line with previous literature, e.g. Li et al, 1998), meaning that sharp changes are unlikely. It is 
a persistent phenomenon, which one has to control for.
17 Hence, we recast the cross section 
model in a dynamic panel context: 
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Equation  (3),  again,  suggests  that  the  effect  of  protecting  private  property  is 
conditional on democracy, and incorporates country fixed effects,  i, time-specific effects, λt 
(capturing  common  shocks),  and  an  error  term  ωit.  But  it  also  introduces  a  lag  of  the 
dependent  variable.  Therefore,  a  panel  data  approach  requires  a  further  refinement.  The 
resulting Fixed Effects (FE) estimates of φ would be, by construction, correlated with the 
error  term,  and  are  downward  biased.  This  bias  would  be  transmitted  to  the  remaining 
variables – to the extent that they are correlated to it, thus inducing distortion in the other 
coefficients,  including  (overestimation  or  underestimation  of)  the  impact  of  institutions 
(depending on the direction of correlation).  
                                                 
17  The  idea  of  persistent  inequality  across  generations  has  a  long  history.  Piketty  (2000)  reviews  the  main 
mechanisms of intergenerational mobility (e.g. transmission of wealth, ability, imperfect capital markets).     17 
Since  we  are  handling  a  small-T-large-N  panel,  the  size  of  this  bias  will  not  be 
negligible (as T increases, FE estimator is consistent).  This problem can just as well be 
handled using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. In a panel context, lagged 
values of the endogenous variables are valid instruments, as long as there is no (2
nd order) 
serial correlation in the disturbances. However, such procedures are data intensive and require 
a fairly large number of consecutive observations: a standard that inequality, and property 
rights, data does not accommodate. Assuming that the instruments are relevant and valid, the 
resulting loss of degrees of freedom would be large when exploiting lags to use the available 
moment conditions. We are constrained by the sample size instead. And only few countries 
have as many as three adjacent observations for inequality.
18  
Notwithstanding,  a  dynamic  approach  is  still  feasible  in  this  context.  Several 
suggestions have been proposed to correct for the bias of the FE estimator (see Baltagi, 2008, 
pp.147-148). In particular, Bruno (2005) extends previous results on bias approximation for 
finite samples by Bun and Kiviet (2003) to unbalanced panels. In its essence, this approach 
first suggests an expression to measure the FE bias and, using Monte Carlo Simulations, 
considers  three  possible  nested  approximations  of  the  bias.
19  We  correct  for  the  most 
comprehensive one, B3 (in the original notation). This results in a Least Squares Dummy 
Variable  Corrected  estimates  (LSDVC),  initialised  by  consistent  estimates  for  dynamic 
models, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator (with instrument in levels), which subtract the 
bias adjustments for each coefficient from FE estimates and apply bootstrapping to calculate 
the standard errors of the adjusted coefficients.   
                                                 
18  Suppose,  for  example,  we  use  the  methodology  proposed  by  Anderson  and  Hsiao  (1982),  i.e.  to  time 
difference (a simplified version of) equation (3) to remove country fixed effects: 
'
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Such  transformation  consumes  the  first  observation  in  each  wave.  Then  equation  (4)  cannot  be  estimated 
consistently by OLS. But, in the absence of serial correlation in the original residual, ωit (i.e., no second order 
serial correlation in  ωit), Ineqit−2 is uncorrelated with  ωit, so can be used as instrument for  Ineqit−1 to obtain 
consistent estimates. Similarly, yit−2 is used as an instrument for  yit−1. It is easy to verify that such procedure 
rapidly leads our sample size to less than eighty observations when instrumenting  Ineqit−1 with two lags (in 
levels). In addition, we find that the instruments do not always show satisfactory relevance. This is actually a 
well-known  problem  daunting  the  practice  of  dynamic  panels.  Estimators  relying  on  first-differencing  to 
eliminate unobserved individual-specific effects will generate, with persistent series (close enough to random 
walks), first-differences close to innovations, and it will be unlikely that available lags identify the parameters of 
interest. Intuitively, they tend to be correlated very little with first-differences. Econometric theory has rapidly 
developed  estimators  that  exploit  additional  moment  conditions  (see  Baltagi,  2008,  149-163).  Although 
Anderson-Hsiao estimator leads to consistent estimates, it is not efficient, since, under the assumption of no 
further serial correlation in ωit, not only Ineqit−2, but all further lags of Ineqit are uncorrelated with  ωit, and can 
also be used as additional instruments. For example, Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a GMM estimator using 
all of these moment conditions. When they are all valid, this GMM estimator is more efficient than Anderson-
Hsiao estimators. These and other estimators, that improved on them in recent years, are all the more infeasible. 
The literature is debating under what conditions one can add additional instruments, trading the loss of degrees 
of freedom with a potential increase in GMM efficiency (see Baltagi, 2008, pp.164-169).   18 
4.2.1 Results 
Table 3 estimates (3) by OLS, Within FE and, in the last column, by LSDVC. In 
dynamic panel data models, OLS and FE are the ‘upper’ and ‘lower bound’ estimates of φ, 
respectively. They serve the purpose of assessing the bias (in φ as well as β2 and β3) and allow 
comparisons with the adjusted estimates. In our case, β2 and β3 are underestimated by OLS, 
where lagged Gini is overestimated. The opposite holds for unadjusted FE estimates. LSDVC 
estimates  fall  in  between,  as  expected.  The  effects  of  property  rights  and  democracy  on 
inequality are as expected, not just in the long run (as found in the cross-section estimates) but 
also when looking at their changes, as captured by FE estimator. 
Table 3 [about here] 
In a dynamic context, the ‘short run’ (5-year) impact of property rights on inequality is 
our usual partial effect as expressed by β2 and β3. This can now be distinguished from the long 
run multiplier. If causal, this estimate would imply that a one-unit strengthening of private 
property protection increases the ‘steady-state’ value of inequality by a cumulative, long run 
effect of (β2+β3Iit)/(1 - φ). The bias-adjusted FE model suggests it is: (1.34-0.081*I)/(1-0.449), 
which  is  equal  to  2.431,  when  evaluated  at  democracy  first  decile  (which  is  zero).  The 
corresponding effect for one standard deviation of property rights, instead, would be 3.35 Gini 
points.  This  effect  is  relatively  large,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  mean  of  inequality  in 
developing countries is 49.76. 
20  
Note  also  that,  since  Vanhanen’s  democratisation  minimum  score  is  zero  in  a 
nontrivial number of cases (31.24% cases), β2 (and its corresponding long-run effect) can 
have an interpretation that is theoretically – as well as empirically – relevant for the ‘short 
run’ impact of property rights on inequality. However, a full assessment of the partial effects 
shall  also  look  at  when  the  moderating  effect  of  β3  is  taken  into  account,  i.e.,  when 
democratisation  takes  values  greater  than  zero.  Based  on  the  estimates  of  the  LSDVC 
regression,  in  table  4,  we  have  calculated  significance  and  magnitude  of  the  effects  of 
property  rights  evaluated  at  different  points  of  the  democracy  distribution  for  the  whole 
sample  of  developing  economies.  We  have  substituted  to  β3  the  median  score  of 
democratisation, its 1
st and 4
th quartile, as well as its 1
st and top decile scores.  
Table 4 [about here] 
There is a positive effect when the partial effect of property rights is evaluated at the 
                                                                                                                                                         
19 In particular, with an increasing level of accuracy: B
1 = c1(T
-1); B2 = B1 + c2(N
-1T
-1); B3 = B2 + c3 (N
-1T
-2). 
20 Incidentally, the lagged inequality coefficient implies that, in a five-year period, developing economies close 
55.51% of the gap between the ‘equilibrium’ value of inequality and its current value.   19 
first decile and quartile of democracy (which is the same, as they are both zero) of 1.34 
inequality  points,  for  a  one-unit  increase  in  property  rights.  The  effect  of  a  one-standard 
deviation change in property rights (1.583 points) could trigger an increase of 2.12 Gini points 
in a five-year timeframe. The partial effect is still positive and marginally significant when 
democracy is at its median. For a relevant number of countries in the sample, there is an 
increase in inequality associated when property rights protection is greater. The partial effect 
is still positive when democracy is measured at its 3
rd quartile, but  is insignificant. Finally, 
when democracy  at its  top decile is plugged in, the partial effect changes its sign into a 
negative one, but it is not statistically significant. This is interesting though. For it shows that 
only when countries achieve a high level of democracy they have sufficiently representative 
systems  to  reverse  the  inequality-worsening  effect  of  property  rights  regimes,  or  at  least 
neutralise it. To put it another way, few countries seem to have equitable political institutions 
such that the partial effect of economic institutions may be reversed and show a negative sign.  
4.2.2 Further results on the role of democratisation 
The type of political environment could also affect the access to production factors: 
physical  and  financial  capital,  land,  human  capital.  Developing  democratic  attributes  – 
franchise extension, freedom of association, government accountability – could influence the 
functioning of the education system, the land and credit markets. Governments can be forced 
by the electoral process to design land reforms and to regulate the credit market that would 
thus become less concentrated. Human capital can become affordable to the have-nots, in 
democracies, by promoting the acquisition of skills among different sectors of the population, 
improving the quality of education systems and public health care (e.g. Robinson, 2001; Lake 
and Baum, 2001; Baum and Lake, 2003). Therefore, in democracies, the extent of education, 
land  inequality  and  financial  development  can  have  a  different  impact  than  in 
nondemocracies, improving the access to the factors of production for the poor. 
Table 5 [about here] 
To test if property rights if actually picking the effect such mechanisms, we have 
interacted  democracy  with  our  proxy  for  asset  inequality,  financial  development  and 
education. We expect that the effect of education and financial development reduce income 
inequality, such effects are stronger in more democratic systems; the effect of asset inequality 
increases income inequality, but this effect is weaker in democracies. Results are reported 
table 5, where we repeat the same exercise as in table 3, when including all the hypothesised 
interaction terms of democracy. We would expect that the effect of education and of financial   20 
development reduces income inequality, and such effects should be stronger in democracies. 
But there is no evidence that democracy has an effect through the functioning of education, 
financial development, and the distribution of assets. The only channel is by influencing the 
functioning of property rights rules as the only significant interaction term of democracy is 
the one with property rights. 
We have experimented with other democracy data – e.g. Polity IV, using the Polity2 
variable – obtaining similar results. As a robustness check, tables 3 and 5 regressions have 
also been estimated when excluding, in turn, the continents from the regression. Signs stay as 
expected in all cases. However, when excluding Latin American and Asian countries, our 
coefficients of interest loose significance at the conventional levels. However, it must also be 
said that the sample size drops (sharply) to 64 and 86 observations respectively. Hence, it is 
difficult to tell if Latin America or Asia are crucial for the results because of their relevance to 
the hypotheses under investigation or simply because we have a loss of degrees of freedom. 
21 
 4.2.3 A closer look at the distribution of income 
The results from a dynamic specification can also be analysed for different segments 
of the distribution of income (table 6): the share of income accruing to the bottom and the top 
quintiles and deciles as well as the share of income accruing to the three middle quintiles. We 
find  that,  in  the  absence  of  democracy,  property  rights  institutions  increase  the  share  of 
income of the upper classes, and decrease the share of the middle class (the sum of the three 
middle quintiles). This effect should be eroded when democracy increases. Finally, there is no 
evidence of property regimes depressing the share of income accruing to the bottom quintile 
and  deciles,  which  is  interesting  because  it  is  suggestive  of  the  effects  of  institutions  on 
poverty. The message is that, in the absence of political equality, economic institutions make 
the upper classes richer while leaving the lower classes trailing behind. 
Table 6 [about here] 
We have also extended the results of table 5 to the case of multiple interactions of 
democracy, to check if they might be affecting specific classes. The same observations of the 
foregoing discussion remain valid.  
                                                 
21 Two further remarks are in order.
 Measurement error, as the discrepancy between our institutional indicators 
and the ‘true’ concept of institutions we would like to capture, could affect both property rights and democracy. 
If the noise can be approximated by classic errors in variables assumption (measurement error is uncorrelated 
with the true variable we would like to observe), this is a source of attenuation bias. Therefore, it stacks the odds 
against our results, implying that estimates of the partial effect of property rights are conservative. Secondly, a 
brief remark on endogeneity is due. Income inequality and property rights simultaneously affects each or they 
could be linked over time by a feedback process. Perhaps it could not be a concern as we find no evidence of 
2nd-order serial correlation in the residuals, suggesting there may be no feedback from inequality to institutions.    21 
4.3  Discussion of  results 
Fixed  Effects  evidence  confirms  our  previous  cross-section  results  and  shows  that 
positive changes in property rights protection are associated with a change in the same sign of 
income inequality. Moving towards a more democratic political system can counteract this 
effect. Hence, strengthening property rights regimes can increase the concentration of income 
in the hands of the few, especially in countries with poor levels of political equality. A closer 
look at distribution of income reveals that property rights increase the income of top quintile 
and  decile,  and  decrease  the  middle  class  share.  An  increase  in  democratisation  would 
counterbalance this, while we have weak evidence that property rights affect the share of 
bottom quintile and decile.  The role of democracy seems to be an ‘indirect’ one, working 
only  through  the  property  system.  In  fact,  we  find  no  evidence  that  democracy  affects 
inequality by moderating the effect of financial development, education or forms of asset 
inequality.  
  Taken  together,  cross-section  and  panel  data  results  show  an  interesting  empirical 
regularity, which is robust to the extent that the effect of property rights does not result from 
the omission of any regional fixed effect, historical or country-specific  factor (as well as 
common  shocks).  We  find  that  economic  institutions  have  a  distributional  impact  in 
developing  economies.  But  such  impact  is  conditional  on  the  level  of  democratisation.  
However, one should not be tempted to make stronger claims. Since cross-section regressions 
do  not  control  for  country  and  time  effects,  FE  estimator  is,  in  principle,  an  effective 
complement  to  cross  section  evidence,  but  it  also  removes  all  the  important  variation  in 
income inequality.  In addition, the limited sample size does not allow to assess issues of 
robustness and, more importantly, to address endogeneity as one should want to.  
5. Summary and conclusions   
This paper has tried to bring together two hypotheses. First, economic institutions can 
have a direct impact on income distribution. Second, the extent to which political power is 
shared among citizens matters for the functioning economic institutions, thus making their 
impact different at different stages of democratisation. Taken together, the two hypotheses are 
complements and express the idea that both political and economic rules are important for 
income inequality.  
We  test  both  hypotheses  by  estimating  the  effect  of  property  rights  regimes  and 
political democracy on income inequality on a sample of developing countries. Using cross-
section  and  panel  data  techniques,  we  estimate  a  model  that  embodies  the  possibility  of   22 
interaction between political democracy and property rights measures. We find that property 
rights significantly increase the level of income inequality in the vast majority of developing 
countries, especially in low-democracy political environments. Suggesting that institutions in 
these economies tend to serve the interests of a minority. The inequality-increasing effect may 
be counterbalanced only in systems which are able to develop sufficiently inclusive political 
institutions. As the democratisation process unfolds, this effect should be reduced, albeit to a 
limited extent, implying that more political equality modifies the functioning of institutions so 
to ease economic inequality. The role of democracy seems to be an ‘indirect’ one and is 
channelled  only  through  the  property  rights  system.  In  fact,  we  find  no  evidence  that 
democracy affects inequality by moderating the effect of financial development, education 
and asset inequality.  
Our  results  seem  to  support  the  view  that,  in  the  last  decades,  institutional 
arrangements  in  most  developing  countries  have  worked  according  to  the  interests  of 
dominant groups, thereby  not  granting opportunities to lower classes.  A limitation of our 
analysis is that it is not able to assess the specific channels through which property rights 
affect inequality. This remains at speculative level – e.g. oligarchies’ rent-seeking behaviour 
and control of key markets – and perhaps deserves further investigation. 
The effect of inequality on development has attracted a lot of attention again since the 
1990s. Recently, a World Development Report (World Bank, 2005) has argued that inequality 
hinders  development  as  it  prevents  the  poor  from  being  part  of  the  economically  active 
population and restricts the equality of opportunities for some members of the society so 
diverting resources from investment. The relationships we have identified are relevant in the 
analysis of the inequality-development relationship. They flag the importance of institutional 
issues  and  might  lead  to  some  interesting  policy  indications.  Even  when  stimulating 
investment, property rights systems could also  harm economic activity in the long-run, if 
inequality  reaches  socially  unsustainable  levels.  When  designing  reforms  aimed  at 
strengthening investment incentives, the distributional consequences of institutional change 
cannot  ignore  issues  of  political  equality  either  (and  its  consolidation  within  the  political 
system). The likely outcome could be attractive: getting economic institutions right – property 
rights, in particular – could deliver both efficiency and equity.    23 
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Appendix   
Table A1: List of countries 
Asia (9)  JAM                 Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica       ETH                Ethiopia  Ethiopia  Ethiopia  Ethiopia      
BGD              Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh       MEX                  Mexico  Mexico  Mexico  Mexico     GAB                   Gabon Gabon Gabon Gabon       
IND                   India India India India       NIC               Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua       GMB             Gambia, The Gambia, The Gambia, The Gambia, The      
IDN               Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia       PAN                  Panama   Panama   Panama   Panama     GHA                  Ghana  Ghana  Ghana  Ghana      
MYS                Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia     PRY                Paraguay  Paraguay  Paraguay  Paraguay     GIN                  Guinea Guinea Guinea Guinea      
PAK                Pakistan  Pakistan  Pakistan  Pakistan     PER                    Peru  Peru  Peru  Peru     GNB           Guinea Guinea Guinea Guinea- - - -Bissau Bissau Bissau Bissau      
PNG        Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea   TTO       Trinidad & Tobago Trinidad & Tobago Trinidad & Tobago Trinidad & Tobago     KEN                   Kenya  Kenya  Kenya  Kenya      
PHL             Philippines  Philippines  Philippines  Philippines     URY                 Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay     MLI                    Mali  Mali  Mali  Mali      
LKA               Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka     VEN           Venezuela, RB Venezuela, RB Venezuela, RB Venezuela, RB     MWI                  Malawi 
THA                Thailand Thailand Thailand Thailand      North Africa & Mid. East (7)  MRT              Mauritania  Mauritania  Mauritania  Mauritania     
Latin America & Carib. (21)  DZA                 Algeria Algeria Algeria Algeria       MOZ              Mozambique Mozambique Mozambique Mozambique     
ARG               Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina       EGY        Egypt,  Egypt,  Egypt,  Egypt, Arab Rep. Arab Rep. Arab Rep. Arab Rep.       NER                   Niger  Niger  Niger  Niger       
BOL                 Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia       IRN      Iran, Islamic Rep. Iran, Islamic Rep. Iran, Islamic Rep. Iran, Islamic Rep.       NGA                 Nigeria  Nigeria  Nigeria  Nigeria      
BRA                  Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil       JOR                  Jordan  Jordan  Jordan  Jordan       RWA                  Rwanda  Rwanda  Rwanda  Rwanda    
CHL                   Chile Chile Chile Chile       MAR                 Morocco  Morocco  Morocco  Morocco     SEN                 Senegal  Senegal  Senegal  Senegal     
COL                Colombia  Colombia  Colombia  Colombia       TUN                 Tunisia  Tunisia  Tunisia  Tunisia     SLE            Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Sierra Leone     
CRI              Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica       TUR                  Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey  ZAF            South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa      
DOM          Dominican Rep. Dominican Rep. Dominican Rep. Dominican Rep.      Sub-Saharan Africa (25)  UGA                  Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda     
ECU                 Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador       BWA                Botswana Botswana Botswana Botswana  TZA                Tanzania Tanzania Tanzania Tanzania     
SLV             El Salvad El Salvad El Salvad El Salvador or or or       BFA            Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso       ZMB                  Zambia Zambia Zambia Zambia     
GTM               Guatemala  Guatemala  Guatemala  Guatemala        CIV           Cote d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire       ZWE                Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 
GUY                  Guyana Guyana Guyana Guyana       CAF    Central African Rep. Central African Rep. Central African Rep. Central African Rep.        
HND                Honduras  Honduras  Honduras  Honduras          
Table A2: Descriptive statistics, cross-section sample  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Family farms land (%) 1988            58  43.431  16.907  8  73 
Gini coeff. 1991-2005 (WIID)  58  45.510  8.428  28.9  63.18 
ln(GDP) 1980              58  7.402  0.792  5.73  9.327 
Prop. rights 1980-1990 (Fraser)  47  4.106  1.256  2.071  6.475 
Prop. rights 1980-1990 (ICRG)  55  22.707  6.264  10.851  37.014 
M2/GDP 1986-1990            58  46.057  103.164  0.868  798.42 
Political rights 1972-1990             58  2.466  1.586  0.055  6 
Democratisation 1960-1990              58  5.437  5.952  0  21.817 
Education (sec. enrolment rate) 1965           57  16.298  13.468  1  53 
ln(wheat/sugar)         53  -0.019  0.149  -0.392  0.577 
Table A3: Descriptive statistics, panel data sample 
Variable    Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
Gini coeff.  overall  49.764  10.118  29.897  77.169  N =     120 
  between    10.536  31.304  77.169  n =      42 
  within    2.358  42.408  57.906  T-bar = 2.857 
Bottom quintile share  overall  3.742  1.321  1.300  7.93  N =      72 
  between    1.377  1.300  7.78  n =      30 
  within    0.366  2.130  5.075  T-bar=     2.4 
Top quintile share  overall  56.201  6.197  42.165  77.355  N =      72 
  between    6.710  42.782  77.355  n =      30 
  within    1.672  49.807  63.101  T-bar=     2.4 
Bottom decile share  overall  1.297  0.585  0.257  3.43  N =      72 
  between    0.603  0.257  3.19  n =      30 
  within    0.171  0.608  1.746  T-bar=     2.4 
Top decile share  overall  40.171  6.589  26.7  67.439  N =      72 
  between    7.551  27.697  67.439  n =      30 
  within    1.615  34.071  46.371  T-bar=     2.4 
Middle class share  overall  39.943  5.125  21.066  51.2  N =      70 
  between    5.656  21.066  49.922  n =      29 
  within    1.367  34.632  45.281  T-bar = 2.413 
Prop. rights    overall  4.716  1.300  1.583  7.407  N =     120 
(Fraser)  between    1.113  2.439  6.556  n =      42 
  within    0.821  2.090  6.539  T-bar = 2.857 
Democratisation   overall  13.187  9.166  0  40.76  N =     120 
(Vanhanen)  between    7.842  0  31.3872  n =      42 
  within    5.113  -10.779  22.72976  T-bar = 2.857 
Education  overall  1.157  0.599  0.122  2.796  N =     120 
(years of schooling)  between    0.588  0.122  2.15  n =      42 
  within    0.254  0.364  2.577  T-bar = 2.857 
Inflation (CPI)  overall  55.180  42.015  1.16e-09  150.148  N =     120 
  between    34.017  0.300  138.127  n =      42 
  within    30.292  -3.652  163.541  T-bar = 2.857 
ln(GDP)  overall  7.327  1.085  4.940  8.955  N =     120 
  between    1.093  4.983  8.847  n =      42 
  within    0.168  6.565  7.882  T-bar = 2.857 
M2/GDP  overall  38.109  22.445  8.186  119.625  N =     120 
  between    20.139  8.186  107.288  n =      42 
  within    9.667  -7.358  72.385  T-bar = 2.857 
Asset inequality  overall  44.701  17.775  20  90.7  N =     120 
  between    19.012  21.571  90.7  n =      42 
  within    3.818  32.001  56.0016  T-bar = 2.857 
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Table 1  Table 1  Table 1  Table 1 - - - - Income inequality, property rights and democracy  Income inequality, property rights and democracy  Income inequality, property rights and democracy  Income inequality, property rights and democracy       
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient, 1991-2000 (WIID) 
  Ols1  Ols2        Ols3  Ols4  IRLS  ols8  IRLS     
Education 1965            -0.130  -0.218           -0.229      -0.257      -0.448***  -0.275**  -0.386*** 
  (0.130)  (0.144)          (0.154)     (0.170)     (0.120)  (0.117)  (0.090)    
M2/GDP 1986-1990            -0.087  -0.061            0.036      0.058      0.145**  0.068  0.130**   
  (0.054)  (0.056)          (0.068)     (0.070)     (0.054)  (0.060)  (0.049)    
Family farms land (%) 1988           -0.192***  -0.173***        -0.088      -0.044      -0.008  -0.036  0.026     
  (0.059)  (0.060)          (0.074)     (0.066)     (0.077)  (0.088)  (0.086)    
ln(GDP) 1980              3.202  4.249*           6.476***  7.695***  7.971***  6.812***  5.818***  
  (2.026)  (2.131)          (2.004)     (1.379)     (1.905)  (1.419)  (2.015)    
Democ. 1960-1990              -0.348*  1.198*           1.011      1.042      1.523*     
  (0.206)  (0.680)          (0.608)     (0.695)     (0.825)     
Political rights 1972-1990                       6.436***  5.891*    
            (1.929)  (3.195)    
Prop.Rights 1980-90 (Fraser)  1.335  3.045***         1.830*     2.166**    2.571**     
  (0.831)  (0.954)          (0.973)     (0.938)     (1.174)     
Prop.Rights 1980-90 (ICRG)            1.630***  1.641**   
            (0.378)  (0.652)    
Prop.rights * Democratis.    -0.312**         -0.276**   -0.281**  -0.361**  -0.476***  -0.442**   
    (0.121)          (0.109)     (0.120)     (0.156)  (0.120)  (0.201)    
MENA                  -5.307      -8.459**    -8.159**  -8.872**  -8.189**   
      (3.670)     (3.110)     (3.985)  (3.629)  (3.828)    
Sub-Saharan Africa                 9.444***   9.985***  12.163***  7.393**  9.852***  
      (3.366)     (3.305)     (2.993)  (3.419)  (2.968)    
Latin America                     5.653      6.541      11.985***  6.306  12.137***  
      (4.288)     (4.570)     (3.637)  (5.159)  (3.897)    
ln(wheat/sugar)               -4.115      1.543  -10.766**  -7.407     
        (5.641)     (5.826)  (5.094)  (5.360)    
Constant                31.502**  15.464           -7.532      -20.471     -29.471*  -28.002**  -26.661    
  (14.791)  (17.420)         (17.341)     (12.348)     (15.851)  (10.649)  (16.703)    
F-stat               9.416***  7.519***        9.456***  14.466***  9.515***  18.521***  9.109*** 
Adj. R-Sq.           0.338  0.373            0.520      0.601      0.685  0.617  0.690     
Obs.                47  47          47   44     44  41  41     
RMSE                 6.791  6.608            5.782      5.391      5.319    5.144  4.978     
Estimator   OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IRLS  OLS  IRLS 
Note: *, ** and *** stand for significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively, two-tailed test – Heteroskedasticity-
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. OLS specifications pass Normality test of residuals (Jarque-Bera test) 
and Ramsey RESET test (with square and cubic y-hat). 
 
Figure 4: Partial effect of property rights at different stages of democratisation  
NER TUN JOR KEN CAF MLI DZA EGY TZA GHA UGA GAB SEN THA ZAF IDN BRA ZMB BGD PAK NGA PRY MEX
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Ta Ta Ta Table 2: Income inequality, property rights and democracy  ble 2: Income inequality, property rights and democracy  ble 2: Income inequality, property rights and democracy  ble 2: Income inequality, property rights and democracy – – – – OLS estimates  OLS estimates  OLS estimates  OLS estimates       
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient, 1991-2000 (WIID) 
Excluded continent:  Latin America    Asia             MENA          SS Africa     
         
Education 1965            -0.188  -0.196  -0.316***  -0.114     
  (0.202)  (0.139)  (0.082)  (0.110)     
M2/GDP 1986-1990            -0.012  -0.085  0.030  -0.043     
  (0.116)  (0.087)  (0.032)  (0.055)     
Family farms land (%) 1988           -0.140  -0.134  -0.109*  -0.127*    
  (0.214)  (0.084)  (0.056)  (0.066)     
log(GDP) 1980              1.600  4.338*  6.987***  7.629**   
  (3.339)  (2.378)  (1.275)  (2.760)     
Political rights 1972-1990             12.471**  6.681***  7.738***  5.505     
  (4.756)  (2.370)  (1.953)  (4.591)     
Prop. rights 1980-1990 (ICRG)  3.442**  1.563***  1.946***  1.429*    
  (1.307)  (0.549)  (0.480)  (0.727)     
Prop. rights * Pol. rights  -0.875*  -0.479***  -0.578***  -0.397     
  (0.403)  (0.154)  (0.123)  (0.272)     
log(wheat/sugar)         -29.862*  -7.562  -11.631**  -15.669**   
  (13.908)  (5.562)  (5.462)  (6.296)     
Constant   -7.793  3.625  -23.218*  -25.355     
  (22.690)  (20.102)  (11.507)  (27.551)     
F-stat  6.080***  3.217***  17.495***  8.409*** 
Adj. R-Sq.  0.232  0.373  0.529  0.490     
Obs.  21  33  38  32     
RMSE  7.770  5.949  5.549  5.879     
Note: *, ** and *** stand for significant at 10, 5, and 1% respectively, two-tailed test – 
Heteroskedasticity-Robust  Standard  errors  in  parenthesis.  OLS  specifications  pass  Normality 
test of residuals (Jarque-Bera test) and Ramsey RESET test (with square and cubic y-hat). 
 
Table  Table  Table  Table 3 3 3 3       - - - - Income inequality: Dynamic model  Income inequality: Dynamic model  Income inequality: Dynamic model  Income inequality: Dynamic model       
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient (WIID) 
Estimation method:  OLS  Within FE   LSDVC    
Ginit-1   0.947***  0.282**  0.449*** 
  (0.043)  (0.137)  (0.127)     
Education   -1.076  0.455  0.257     
  (0.870)  (1.732)  (1.851)     
M2/GDP  -0.010  0.004  -0.003     
  (0.015)  (0.052)  (0.039)     
Asset inequality  -0.029  0.230**  0.197**   
  (0.039)  (0.095)  (0.092)     
Property rights  0.318  1.409**  1.340**   
  (0.697)  (0.659)  (0.668)     
Democratisation  0.080  0.380**  0.371*    
  (0.177)  (0.144)  (0.204)     
Prop.Rigths * Democratisation  -0.030  -0.084***  -0.081**   
  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.038)     
lnGDP                -14.301**  -3.385  -7.284     
  (6.536)  (13.188)  (14.481)     
lnGDP2   0.968**  -0.037  0.254     
  (0.461)  (0.988)  (0.995)     
Inflation (CPI)  0.035  0.021  0.020     
  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.021)     
Constant   54.286**  40.219                  
  (20.879)  (45.325)                  
Time effects   Yes   Yes   Yes  
F-stat  70.831***  23.298***                  
R-Sq.  0.891  0.541                  
Obs.  120  120  120     
Countries  42  42  42     
Note: *, **, *** and **** stand for significant at 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% respectively, two-
tailed  test  –  FE  and  Pooled  OLS  Standard  errors,  in  parenthesis,  are  robust  for 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level. LSDVC standard errors 
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Table  Table  Table  Table 4 4 4 4       – – – – Partial effect of property rights at different democratisation stages  Partial effect of property rights at different democratisation stages  Partial effect of property rights at different democratisation stages  Partial effect of property rights at different democratisation stages       
 
Democratisation 1st decile (0)            
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P-value  95% Conf.Interval 
Marg. effect on Inequality  1.340  0.668  2.01  0.045  0.031  2.649 
 
Democratisation 1st quartile (0)     
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P-value  95% Conf.Interval 
Marg. effect on Inequality  1.340  0.668  2.01  0.045  0.031  2.649 
 
Democratisation median (3.16)         
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P-value  95% Conf.Interval 
Marg. effect on Inequality  1.085  0.579  1.87  0.061  -0.050  2.221 
 
Democratisation 3rd quartile (12.58) 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P-value  95% Conf.Interval 
Marg. effect on Inequality  0.324  0.418  0.78  0.438  -0.495  1.144 
 
Democratisation 10th decile (18.52)           
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P-value  95% Conf.Interval 
Marg. effect on Inequality  -0.155  0.451  -0.34  0.730  -1.040  0.728 
Note: observed quartile and decile values are in parentheses  
 
Table  Table  Table  Table 5 5 5 5       - - - - Income inequality: Dynamic model with democracy interactions  Income inequality: Dynamic model with democracy interactions  Income inequality: Dynamic model with democracy interactions  Income inequality: Dynamic model with democracy interactions       
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient (WIID) 
Estimation method:  OLS  FE, within    LSDVC     
Ginit-1   0.926****  0.328**  0.514**** 
  (0.044)  (0.138)  (0.135)     
Education   -3.461*  -0.941  -1.423     
  (1.900)  (3.680)  (3.077)     
M2/GDP  -0.003  -0.008  -0.015     
  (0.039)  (0.105)  (0.081)     
Asset inequality  -0.026  0.196***  0.158     
  (0.055)  (0.068)  (0.104)     
Property rights  0.794  1.492**  1.422**   
  (0.643)  (0.590)  (0.674)     
Democratisation  0.124  -0.067  -0.140     
  (0.242)  (0.323)  (0.437)     
Prop.Rights * Democratisation       -0.073**  -0.087***  -0.085**   
  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.039)     
Education * Democratisation  0.155   0.124  0.145 
  (0.109)  (0.184)  (0.163)     
M2/GDP * Democratisation  0.000   0.001  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)     
Asset inequality * Democrat.  -0.070     0.816*  0.924 
  (0.369)  (0.443)  (0.572)     
lnGDP                -12.182*  -10.637  -16.125     
  (6.294)  (11.705)  (17.074)     
lnGDP2   0.827*  0.471  0.862     
  (0.444)  (0.876)  (1.186)     
Inflation (CPI)  0.031  0.021  0.021     
  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.022)     
Constant                47.260**  65.036                 
  (19.151)  (42.406)                 
Time effects   Yes   Yes   Yes  
F-stat           51.164****  35.753****                 
R-Sq.            0.897  0.566                 
Obs.                   120  120  120     
Countries  42  42  42     
Note: *, **, *** and **** stand for significant at 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% respectively, two-
tailed  test  –  FE  and  Pooled  OLS  Standard  errors,  in  parenthesis,  are  robust  for 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level. LSDVC standard errors 
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Table 6 Table 6 Table 6 Table 6       - - - - Income inequality: Dynamic model, LSDVC estimates  Income inequality: Dynamic model, LSDVC estimates  Income inequality: Dynamic model, LSDVC estimates  Income inequality: Dynamic model, LSDVC estimates by income shares  by income shares  by income shares  by income shares       




1st decile   10th decile   Middle 
class share 
Inequalityt-1  0.015  0.220  0.037  0.256  0.241 
  (0.220)  (0.177)  (0.209)  (0.177)  (0.195) 
Education   -0.561  1.063  -0.256  0.940  -0.603 
  (0.789)  (1.613)  (4.398)  (1.560)  (1.403) 
M2/GDP  0.004  -0.033  0.004  -0.042  0.022 
  (0.018)  (0.034)  (0.099)  (0.033)  (0.034) 
Asset inequality  -7.325  13.469  -3.212  11.116  -9.246 
  (5.225)  (9.815)  (28.047)  (9.316)  (8.889) 
Property rights  -0.155  1.749***  -0.037  1.995***  -1.533** 
  (0.380)  (0.675)  (2.212)  (0.665)  (0.662) 
Democratisation  -0.052  0.325  -0.018  0.354*  -0.266 
  (0.119)  (0.215)  (0.670)  (0.208)  (0.174) 
Prop.Rights * Democrat.     0.010  -0.065  0.003  -0.067*  0.056* 
  (0.022)  (0.040)  (0.124)  (0.039)  (0.034) 
ln(gdp)                -5.113  29.064  -4.203  34.568  -18.853 
  (16.005)  (31.089)  (91.370)  (30.185)  (24.047) 
ln(gdp)2   0.409  -2.143  0.308  -2.408  1.440 
  (1.040)  (2.034)  (5.982)  (1.974)  (1.533) 
Inflation (CPI)  -0.000  0.003  0.000  0.004  -0.001 
  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.051)  (0.017)  (0.010) 
Time effects   Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  66  66  66  66  65 
Countries  28  28  28  28  27 
Note: *, **, *** and **** stand for significant at 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% respectively, two-
tailed test. LSDVC standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping (50 repetitions). Time 
dummies are jointly significant. 
 